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Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that transfers of assets or
security interests1 by the bankrupt on account of antecedent debts,
made within four months of the petition in bankruptcy and while the
bankrupt was insolvent, 2 are "preferences" and may be avoided by the
trustee if he proves that the creditors receiving them had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
transfer.: The Bankruptcy Act revision now before Congress (H.R.
8200) reduces the preference period to three months, but eliminates
the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement and shifts the burden
of going forward on the question of insolvency to the transferee. 4
The most obvious function of preference law is to enrich the estate
by recovering moneys paid to creditors in the months before the filing
1. Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970) ("transfer" broadly defined).
2. A firm is insolvent in the "bankruptcy" or "balance-sheet" sense if it has assets at
fair valuation insufficient to pay its debts. Id. § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970).
3. Id. § 60(a), (b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a), (b) (1970). To be a preference, a transfer must also
give the transferee a "greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class." Id. § 60(a), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970). The "classes" referred to are defined by id.
§ 64(a), 11 U.S.C. § 10 4(a) (1970), which grants priorities for wages, taxes, and certain
rents. See 3 J. MOORE & L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 60.34, at 904 (14th ed. 1977).
As a practical matter, the "greater percentage" requirement encompasses virtually all
payments to ordinary creditors during insolvency, see id. 60.34. In addition to the
provisions of § 60, § 67(a) makes judicial liens obtained within the four-month period
during the debtor's insolvency voidable without regard to the transferee's knowledge.
These provisions account for most of American preference law. Preferences were valid
at common law, 3 J. MooRE & L. KINC, supra 60.02, at 755, and the few state statutes
that remain, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1313.56 (Page 1962), are considered ineffective,
Seligson, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Act, 15 VAND. L. REV. 115, 116 (1961).
4. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 547(b), (f) (1978), passed by House, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H478 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 547(b),
(f) (1977) [bills with substantially identical preference provisions, hereinafter cited without
cross reference to H.R. 8200 only]. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 201-02 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. H.R. 8200 would also make transfers to insiders
vulnerable for an additional nine months subject to the scienter and burden-of-proof
requirements of existing law. H.R. 8200 § 547(b). The term "insider" encompasses the
transferor's officers and directors and their families. Id. § 101(24).
Section 547(c) exempts from preference attack exchanges with the debtor for sub-
stantially contemporaneous new value, id. §§ 547(c)(1), (3), (4), and payments in the
ordinary course of business made within 45 days after the debt was'incurred, id. § 547(c)(2).
Section 547(c) also adopts a new test for determining the extent to which fluctuations in
the value of inventory or receivables covered by a perfected security interest may amount
to preferential transfers, id. § 547(c)(5).
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of the petition.5 These sums can then be redistributed among the
creditors according to the priority rules of the Act0 and the rule of
equality among creditors of the same class. 7 But preference law has
another, less obvious and less discussed function: the control of creditor
behavior during insolvency." By determining whether a transfer will
be valid in bankruptcy, section 60 influences the decision to seek a
transfer. The importance of controlling this decision extends beyond
this goal of maintaining equality" because the ultimate fate of the
firm-and hence its total value-depends in part on the attitudes and
actions of its creditors. 10 The second goal of preference law should be
to maximize the firm's total value by influencing creditor responses to
the firm's situation."1
This Note argues that the value of the firm can be maximized only
if creditor equality is strictly maintained. Part I shows how individual
creditors, in the absence of an effective preference law, may seek in-
dividual gain at the expense of the firm and of the creditor group as a
whole. Part II examines existing preference law and the preference
provisions of H.R. 8200 and concludes that both fail to control the
destructive tendencies described in Part I. Part III then proposes a
preference statute that reduces the existing incentives that now frustrate
the maximization goal by rewarding selfish behavior. The proposed
5. Seligson, supra note 3, at 115 ("[T]he Bankruptcy Act provides the trustee with an
arsenal of weapons to enable him to bring into the estate for distribution property which
in equity and good conscience should be available to all. The power to avoid preferential
transfers is one of these weapons."); Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and
H.R. 32 Before the Subcomu. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Conlin. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1840 (1975-1976) (Leon S. Forman,
Nat'l Bankr. Conf.) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
6. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
7. 3 J. MOORE & L. KING, supra note 3, 60.01, at 743 & n.1; Seligson, supra note 3, at
115. On the Bankruptcy Act's concept of "classes" of creditors, see note 3 supra.
8. J. MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 284 (1956) ("[T]he most
significant effect of the law of preferences is not the value of the assets recovered in
bankruptcy, but the weakening of the inducements to negotiate preferential arrangements
with insolvent debtors."); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 202.
9. Some analyses see deterrence only as a means of promoting equality. See Coi mssION
REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 19.
10. Stierhoff, Insolvency doesn't have to mean bankruptcy, if .... BANKING, August
1975, at 84. Creditor lawsuits are a major short-run factor precipitating voluntary peti-
tions, COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 49, which in turn can lead to liquidation
at a time when the firm's going-concern value is greater than its liquidation value, House
Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 1, at 433, 434 (Peter F. Coogan, Esq.) [testimony hereinafter
cited as Coogan Testimony].
11. The policy of equality does not distinguish between preferences deterred and
preferences taken and then recovered, except with respect to the time-value of money or
other transactions costs. The maximization goal, however, depends for its effectiveness on
deterrence and therefore requires that creditors be aware that obtaining preferences is




statute would realize both goals of preference law more fully than
either section 60 or H.R. 8200, without untoward effects on the ad-
ministration of estates in bankruptcy or on initial decisions to lend.
I. An Analysis of the Insolvency Situation
When a firm is producing funds sufficient to meet its maturing
obligations, bankruptcy law does not concern itself with how or when
such a firm pays its debts.' 2 When the firm is unable to pay its debts
and only some of its creditors can be paid on time, however, there is a
threat to the principle of creditor equality,' 3 and the firm's transfers
are subject to scrutiny.' 4 In these circumstances, the protection of
creditors is an important policy goal.1 The maximization of the value
of the insolvent firm for the benefit of the creditors thus should be one
goal of bankruptcy policy. Yet even though the creditor class has great
power over the firm's immediate future, that power may not be used
to enhance the total value of the firm unless the equality principle is
strictly enforced.
A. The Creditors' Dilemma
No problems of either equality or maximization arise when the
firm's debt is owned by a single creditor. The sole creditor faces two
options: support the firm in the hope of financial recovery and full re-
payment, or liquidate the firm and thereby realize as much of its debt
as possible. The sole creditor can maximize its return only by max-
12. See G. GLENN, THE LAW GOVERNING LIQUIDATION § 13, at 22 (1935); J. MAcLACHLAN,
supra note 8, at 10.
13. Equality among creditors is a basic goal of bankruptcy law. 3 J. MOORE 9- L. KING,
supra note 3, C 60.01, at 743; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 76-79. In the
absence of bankruptcy law or some other collective legal response to the debtor's in-
solvency, certain creditors, acting to exercise their individual remedies, must prevail over
others in the "race of the diligent." G. GLENN, supra note 12, § 5. This would defeat the
equality goal. See 3 J. MOORE & L. KING, supra note 3, 60.01, at 744.
14. The fraudulent conveyance action also scrutinizes such transfers. See, e.g., Bank-
ruptcy Act § 67(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1970); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Acr.
15. G. GLENN, supra note 12, § 3. Protection of creditors from unequal treatment is a
major policy of the Bankruptcy Act. In Chapter X reorganizations, the absolute priority
rule decrees that junior claims cannot be recognized until senior claims are satisfied in full.
Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 527-30 (1941); see Blum & Kaplan,
The Absolute Priority Doctrine In Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651
(1974). Chapter XI arangements are to be "in the best interests of creditors." Bankruptcy
Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1970) (emphasis added). Similarly, although owners might
want to continle the business when their equity is under water but solvency might be
regained, see J. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 8, at 2, the owner's interest in straight bank-
ruptcy is limited to discharge, see, e.g., id. at 16-17; COMMISsION REPORT, supra note 4,
pt. I, at 75, 79-81.
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imizing the value of the firm;16 the decisions of the sole creditor may
therefore be considered the norm with which decisions made in the
multicreditor case should coincide.
Most firms, of course, have many creditors who normally make deci-
sions independently. To enable the creditors to coordinate their
responses to the fate of their common debtor, the law provides a num-
ber of collective mechanisms that parallel the sole creditor's options
of support and liquidation. Through a common law composition, some
or all of the creditors can agree to extend the maturity of their debts,
to scale them down,17 or even to subordinate some debts to others in
the hope of preserving the firm's going-concern value.'8 Alternatively,
the creditors can liquidate the firm among themselves through a com-
position," a general assignment, 20 or a bulk transfer. 2' These out-of-
court settlements are usually preferred to their Bankruptcy Act counter-
parts, the Chapter XI arrangement and the straight bankruptcy liquida-
tion, since they are cheaper and less stigmatizing. 2 2
16. The formal conditions for the sole creditor's responses depend on the relationship
between the firm's prospects and the costs of bankruptcy liquidation. See Van Horne,
Optimal Initiation of Bankruptcy Proceedings by Debt Holders, 31 J. FINANCE 897 (1976).
Although Van Home refers to "debt holders," he treats them as a single decisionmaking
unit. See, e.g., id. at 907. In reality, this decision is based on market, economic, and cash-
flow analyses and the creditor's own evaluation of management. See Stierhoff, Does In-
solvency Mean Bankruptcy?, CREDIT AND FINANCIAL MANAG.EMENT, Mar. 1976, at 14, 15.
17. The common law composition is a mutual reduction of debts or extension of
maturities; it is employed to liquidate a failing business or to enable the business to
survive. G. GLENN, supra note 12, § 85; Nadler, "Methodes Preventives de Faillite": An
American Report on "Proceedings Short of Bankruptcy," 9 MERCER L. REV. 240, 247-48
(1958). Since it is a contractual device, G. GLENN, supra note 12, § 89, the composition
cannot bind nonassenting creditors. J. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 8, at 371. The composition
bars suit by assenting creditors on the underlying debts, G. GLENN, supra note 12, § 90,
at 152, but a secret voluntary preference by the debtor to one of the composing creditors
renders the agreement voidable by the other creditors, id. § 96. They may choose not to
void the composition, however, for the same reason they originally entered the original
composition agreement-a higher return from an ongoing business. Since the nonpreferred
creditors have no action in contract against the preferred creditor, id. §§ 99-102, neither
does the trustee in bankruptcy, id. § 103, because his rights derive from theirs, Bank-
rutpcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
18. See, e.g., All Was Not Well in the War Room, FORTUNE, Nov. 1975, at 25 (at-
tempted work-out of W.T. Grant, involving subordination of $300 million of bank debt
to trade credit) ; House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 1, at 436-37 (Patrick A. Murphy, Esq.).
See generally J. MOORE & IV. PHILLIPS, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 3-1 to 3-12 (4th ed.
1975).
19. G. GLENN, supra note 12, § 85; Nadler, supra note 17, at 247.
20. G. GLENN, supra note 12, § 105; Hanna, Contemporary Utility of General Assign-
ments, 35 VA. L. REv. 539, 539-40 (1949) (general assignment is voluntary transfer by
debtor of all his property to liquidating trustee; rarely occurs without consultation with
creditors); Nadler, supra note 17, at 242-44.
21. Nadler, supra note 17, at 245-47.
22. E.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 47; House Hearings, supra note 5,
pt. I, at 479 (colloquy between Patrick A. Murphy, Esq., and Rep. Butler) ("no question
that an extra[-]judicial settlement of all differences is to be preferred").
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Each individual creditor, however, has a third group of options,
which can undermine the optimality of the decision to liquidate or
support in the multiple creditor case. Law and business custom give
each creditor a number of individual remedies for the persuasion or
coercion of the unwilling but solvent debtor.23 A creditor who chooses
to look only after his own interests may dun,'2 4 threaten, litigate and levy
after judgment, or take possession pursuant to a security interest.25 A
creditor's special business or personal relationship with the debtor may
give him the leverage necessary to obtain a voluntary preferential pay-
ment.2 6 If allowed, such preferences may harm the firm and its remain-
ing creditors, both by increasing the likelihood of failure and by re-
ducing the assets available for proportional distribution to the creditors
in case of failure. Transfers of cash or other assets reduce the firm's
ability to function,2 7 and transfers of security interests reduce the
firm's ability to obtain new financing.2 8 Attachment and levy publicize
the debtor's plight and may force an immediate voluntary petition29
by causing a "run" on the debtor.30
Whether liquidation or support is the appropriate response, uni-
lateral actions by creditors may produce results inferior to the sole-
creditor ideal. When liquidation is called for, the creditor pursuing an
individual remedy may receive a disproportionate share of his debt.31
When support would maximize the total return to creditors, a prefer-
ence is likely to decrease the firm's chances for survival, thereby frus-
tratng both the maximization and the equality goals. In such cases, the
23. See G. GLENN, supra note 12, §§ 4, 5; J. MACLACIILAN, supra note 8, at 3-4, 10.
24. See T. BECKMAN & R. FosTER, CREDITS AND COLLECTIONS: MANAGEMENT AND THEORY
201 (8th ed. 1969).
25. U.C.C. § 9-503 (secured party's right to take possession after default) ; see Zweibel,
Work-Out Problems and Solutions, BANKERS MAGAZINE, Spring 1976, at 87, 88-89 (discussing
advantages of practice).
26. See, e.g., De Stefano v. American Chocolate Almond Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 156, 158 (Ch.
1930) (controlling shareholder caused corporation to repay note he had endorsed); J.
MACLACEILAN, supra note 8, at 284; Interview with Louis Rosenberg, Esq., in New York
City (Nov. 22, 1977), at 7-8 (transcript on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as
Rosenberg Interview].
27. See Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1975) (bank's "harsh unilateral
action" in setting off firm's deposits against debt owed bank may have contributed to
firm's bankruptcy); P. HUNT, C. WVILLIAMIS & G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FINANCE 9-12
(4th ed. 1971). See generally id. at 21-103.
28. A security interest in existing assets is a common precondition for new financing
when a firm is in a precarious state. See, e.g., In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23 (Ist
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976); Stierhoff, supra note 10, at 84-85.
29. Rosenberg Interview, supra note 26, at 2-4.
30. Zweibel, supra note 25, at 89; 28 U. PiTT. L. REv. 344, 350 (1966).
31. The creditor who, in pursuing an individual remedy, publicly provides proof of
the debtor's plight does serve the useful function of informing other creditors. Secret,
voluntary transfers compromise equality with no saving grace. Rosenberg Interview,
supra note 26, at 18.
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preferred creditor gains more than enough at the expense of the
other creditors to offset any losses the preferred creditor incurs through
the damage it does to its customer.32
B. The Function of Preference Law During Insolvency
Preference law is an apt means of encouraging cooperative rather
than individual approaches to the debtor's problems.3B Noncooperative
responses may be voidable preferences under certain circumstances.3 4
If preference law enforced absolute equality in liquidation, individual
approaches would be discouraged because they would not maximize the
total value of the firm, on which the return to each creditor would then
depend. Unilateral action would neither enrich the defector nor harm
the loyal creditor in liquidation, but if the firm survived the defector
would risk losing business as a result of its earlier intransigence. The
supporting creditor, by contrast, might gain business if the firm sur-
vived-as a reward for its loyalty-and yet be no worse off than the
defector in liquidation. When continued operations would erode the
firm's expected value, well-informed, rational creditors would press for
liquidation. These demands would occur under the same circumstances
that would cause a sole creditor to press for liquidation. Since creditors
could further their individual interests only by maximizing the ex-
pected return to their class, an especially well-informed or powerful
creditor, be it a bank, a large supplier, or a small creditor with special
32. The fear that others may obtain payment first also leads to premature attempts
to obtain payment. Restrictions on individual behavior are thus needed to maximize the
total return to the class. See G. Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN NIEDICINL
185, 189 (S. Gorovitz et al. eds. 1976):
There are restrictions which are in the interests of a class of persons taken collectively,
but are such that the immediate interest of each individual is furthered by his
violating the rule when others adhere to it. In such cases the indihiduals involved
may need the use of compulsion, to give effect to their collective judgment of their
own interest ....
See R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94-102 (1957); A. RAI'OPORT & A.
CHAMMAUI, PRISONER's DILEMMA viii-ix (1965) (discussion of nonzero-sum games, especially
the Prisoner's Dilemma).
33. McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARV. L. REV. 233, 235
(1946):
Adjudication in bankruptcy is commonly reserved for cases where slender assets have
precluded compositions or other satisfactory arrangements with creditors. The terms
upon which such settlements can be made are substantially affected by the extent of
the law of preference. A creditor who knows that he can be compelled in bankruptcy
to disgorge undue advantage is in a much better mood to enter into reasonable ar-
rangements than the creditor who feels, not without reason, that he must grab the
debtor's assets to prevent others getting them first.
Accord, House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 3, at 1668 (Richard Kaufman, Nat'l Ass'n of
Credit Management) (elimination of preference law would prejudice out-of-court settle'-
ments); Coogan Testimony, supra note 10, at 433.
34. Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970) (broad definition of "transfer").
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personal knowledge, would no longer be able to exploit its position for
individual gain at the possible expense of the class as a whole.33 Such
creditors would have to act in the interest of all members of their class
to maximize their own return. Although differences in judgment and
information would persist, all creditors would be attempting to ap-
proximate the same decision, that of the sole creditor.
If preference law fails to preserve absolute equality in liquidation,
those creditors who are aware of this failure30 will compete for position
during insolvency rather than cooperating fully in an attempt to maxi-
mize the value of the firmA7 This is in fact the case under both existing
preference law and H.R. 8200.
II. The Inadequacy of Existing Preference Law
Both the present section 603s and the preference provisions of H.R.
820039 fall short of the full-deterrence ideal. Both hold out to nervous
creditors the hope that a contemplated transfer will not be deemed
preferential, and both make it clear to creditors that the most pre-
mature transfers-those that are taken the earliest-will be the most
protected. The provisions that undermine the deterrent effect are the
balance-sheet insolvency test, 40 the fixed time-limit rules4' and, under
section 60, the rule that the trustee must show that the creditor had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of
35. See Rosenberg Interview, supra note 26, at 8.
36. Creditors are aware of the preference provisions, which shape their actions during
their debtors' insolvencies. Coogan Testimony, supra note 10, at 395; see Zweibel, supra
note 25, at 88-89.
37. E.g., House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 1, at 479-80, 503-04 (Patrick A. Murphy,
Esq.); Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcoimn. on
Improvenents in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sebs. 397 (1975) (Benjamin Weintraub & Michael J. Cramer, Esqs.) [hereinafter cited as
Weintraub 9- Cramer]; Rosenberg Interview, supra note 26, at 18; see Zweibel, supra note
25, at 88-94.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
39. H.R. 8200 § 547.
40. Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970):
A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act whenever the
aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed,
transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent
to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in
amount to pay his debts ....
Accord, H.R. 8200 § 101(25). See generally 3 J. MOORE & L. Kixc;, supra note 3, 4 60.30.
41. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970) (preferences restricted to transfers
by the bankrupt occurring "within four months before the filing by or against him of
the petition"); H.R. 8200 § 547(b)(4)(A) C'on or within 90 da)s before the date of the
filing of the petition").
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the transfer.42 H.R. 8200 further undermines the deterrent effect of
preference law by exempting from preference attack payments made
on short-term trade credits.
43
A. Balance-Sheet Insolvency
A financial analyst can often conclude that a firm is in serious dif-
ficulty before the firm is actually balance-sheet insolvent.44 A com-
mercial bank, moreover, can continuously monitor a firm's cash bal-
ances on deposit.45 Since any transfer made during the period before
balance-sheet insolvency is immune from preference attack, early de-
fection is rewarded.4"
Under present law, the trustee must prove that the debtor was in-
solvent at the time of the transfer.4T Since the records of many bank-
rupts are confused and inadequate, the burden of proving insolvency
has defeated many preference actions.48 For preferences taken within
the three-month period preceding the filing of a petition, H.R. 8200
shifts the burden of going forward on the solvency question to the
defendant. The ultimate burden of proof, however, would remain with
the trustee. 49 This change reduces the probability that a given transfer
will survive on solvency grounds.
An additional problem arises when a Chapter XI arrangement rather
than a bankruptcy liquidation is in the offing. Because an arrange-
ment petition may be filed while the debtor firm is not balance-sheet
insolvent, 50 preferences taken on the very eve of the filing of a Chapter
42. Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970). This provision is not present in
H.R. 8200. See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 20 (recommending elimination
of provision).
43. H.R. 8200 § 547(c)(2).
44. Discriminant analysis has shown that financial ratios predict bankruptcy accurately
up to three years in advance, Deakin, A Discriminant Analysis of Predictors of Business
Failure, 10 J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 167, 178 (1972), and a behavioral study using the
same data has shown that loan officers can also predict bankruptcy this long in advance,
Libby, Accounting Ratios and the Prediction of Failure: Some Behavioral Evidence, 13 J.
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 150, 160 (1975).
45. See Rosenberg Interview, supra note 26, at 8.
46. The balance-sheet test of insolvency was originally intended to discourage the filing
of premature petitions, and this has had the "regrettable effect of increasing the in-
equality among creditors through the resulting reduction of the area of recoverable
preferences." 1 J. MooRE & L. KING, supra note 3, 1.19, at 101-03. See id. at 101-03 nn.18
& 22.'
47. 3 J. MOORE & L. KING, supra note 3, 60.30, at 893.
48. CONIMsISSION REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 19; House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 3,
at 1749 (Robert J. Grimmig, Am. Bankers Ass'n Bankruptcy Task Force) (bankrupts'
records "chaotic").
49. H.R. 8200 § 547(f); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 375 (1977) (discussing
§ 547(f) in light of FED. R. EVID. 301).
50. An arrangement petition may be filed when the debtor is "unable to pay his
debts as they mature," Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970), a standard generally
less stringent than balance-sheet insolvency, see pp. 1460-61 infra.
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XI petition may be invulnerable. In such cases, the race of the diligent
continues until the moment the petition is filed. This situation is
anathema to Chapter XI, whose rehabilitative purpose is frustrated
unless the firm maintains uninterrupted control over its operating
assets.'
B. The Time-Limit Rules
The four-month rule "reduce[s] the preference to a sporting proposi-
tion. ' '52 Since creditors cannot be certain whether or when a petition
will be filed, they cannot be certain that any transfer will be voidable.
Other things being equal, a creditor is well advised to defect as soon
as possible. Once the transfer has been made, the creditor has an incen-
tive to postpone the petition by keeping both the transfer and the
debtor's plight secret at a time when candor and cooperation are most
needed. The rule invites creditors to keep debtors out of bankruptcy
for the statutory period and then to abandon them summarily.53 This
may result in a wasting of assets due to mismanagement during this
period,5 4 or even in an unnecessary bankruptcy. Cooperation might
have saved the firm had all the facts been known publicly and had all
the creditors jointly cooperated in the firm's support.
By shortening the preference period to three months for noninsider
preferences, s5 H.R. 8200 increases the probability that a given prefer-
ence will survive bankruptcy. Creditors with influence over the
debtor, once they have been preferred, naturally seek to delay bank-
ruptcy for four months.5 6 The difficulty of this effort increases with
time because knowledge of the debtor's plight spreads and the patience
of the other creditors wears thin."7 H.R. 8200 thus eliminates the need
51. Hertzberg, A Survey of Chapter XI With a Side Trip Through Chapter X, 77
CoM. L.J. 86, 86 (1972).
52. 2 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 384, at 664 (1940).
53. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 3, at 1669 (Richard Kaufman, Nat'l Ass'n of
Credit Management) (quoting former Bankruptcy Judge Daniel R. Cowans); Rosenberg
Interview, supra note 26, at 8; see Zweibel, supra note 25, at 88.
54. See 44 YALE L.J. 109, 119 (1934). Allowing an incompetently managed firm to
survive harms both creditors and the general economy through a misallocation of re-
sources. N. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMIes OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 393-94 (1940).
55. H.R. 8200 § 547(b)(4)(A).
For insider preferences, H.R. 8200 establishes a special period between 90 days and one
year before the petition is filed. During this period transfers may be attacked, H.R. 8200
§ 547(b)(4)(B), but only subject to the defenses available under existing law, see p. 1456
supra; p. 1458 infra. This period may be long enough to dampen hopes of riding out the
preference period. Nevertheless, the availability of other defenses might still lead an
insider to defect.
56. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 3, at 1669 (Richard Kaufman, Nat'l Ass'n of Credit
Management); Rosenberg Interview, supra note 26, at 8.
57. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 3, at 1669 (Richard Kaufman, Nat'l Ass'n of Credit
Management).
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to delay bankruptcy for the fourth (and most difficult) month and
thus may be expected to increase disproportionately the number of
successful defections.
C. The "Reasonable Cause to Believe" Requirement
Section 60(b) requires that in order to avoid a preference the trustee
must prove that the transferee had reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.58 Primarily because of
this requirement, the "vast majority of preferential transfers are never
recovered." 59 By abolishing this requirement within its three-month
time period, 0° H.R. 8200 increases the probability that a given transfer
will be voidable.
D. The H.R. 8200 Trade Credit Loophole
Section 547(c)(2) exempts from preference attack payments made in
the ordinary course of business on account of debts incurred less than
forty-five days before the payment.0 ' Although trade creditors are now
considered to be the group most willing to cooperate in out-of-court
settlements, 62 this provision would encourage them to compel prompt
payment at a time when flexibility in credit terms might maximize the
firm's value.03 Once a timely payment is received, moreover, it is in-
vulnerable to preference attack, and hence bankruptcy would no longer
serve as a threat to force settlement with respect to such creditors. 4
Both with respect to trade debts incurred within forty-five days and
not yet paid, and with respect to debts paid within that period, this
provision would undermine the goal of creditor control.
At the time the transfer is initially contemplated, creditors can
rarely be certain that a particular transfer will be a voidable preference.
As a result, the deterrent effect of preference law is minimal. 5 A
58. 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970). See generally 3 J. MooRE & L. KING, supra note 3,
60.54-.56.
59. Cyr, Setting the Record Straight For A Comprehensive Revision of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 166 (1975).
60. Compare H.R. 8200 § 547(b)(4)(A) with id. § 547(b)(4)(B). Accord, CoMIssION
REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 201.
61. H.R. 8200 § 547(c)(2).
62. P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, supra note 27, at 569.
63. See pp. 1451-55 supra.
64. House Hearing-, supra note 5, pt. 3, at 1669-70 (Richard Kaufman, Nat'l Ass'n of
Credit Management) ('one of the most serious ramifications . . . is to jeopardize the
ability of the majority of creditors . . . to reason with a single creditor threatening at-
tachment").
65. Zweibel, supra note 25, at 88-94; Weintraub & Cramer, supra note 37, at 397;
Hause Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 1, at 479-80 (Patrick A. Murphy, Esq.).
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common and reasonable rule of thumb is to take the transfer and hope
that in the event of preference attack some defense will be found.
66
Even under H.R. 8200, diligent haste in pursuit of individual remedies
remains the best way to ensure that a preference will survive under
both the insolvency and the time-limit rules.
III. Maximization and Strict Equality: A New Preference Rule
This Part proposes and defends a preference provision that could
both maintain intercreditor equality and warn creditors before they
take their preferences that they have nothing to gain from seeking
preferences at the expense of a cooperative solution.67 Under the
proposed rule, transfers would be vulnerable whenever a firm is gen-
erally unable to pay its maturing obligations. This insolvency stan-
dard-known as "equitable insolvency"-68-would put creditors on no-
tice, before the temptation to defect becomes acute, that preferences
will be voided in bankruptcy. The time-limit rules would be replaced
by an affirmative defense protecting preferences given during insol-
vencies unrelated to the one that culminated in bankruptcy.
The proposed rule6 9 would optimize creditor behavior during the
66. Rosenberg Interview, supra note 26, at 18; see Zweibel, supra note 25, at 88-89. A
creditor who knows his debtor is insolvent and has the opportunity to take a transfer
"should take it, of course, and hope that [the debtor] rides out the next four months."
Lecture by Grant Gilmore, Yale Law School (Mar. 8, 1978).
67. It might be objected that the effective elimination of the possibility of securing an
antecedent debt during insolhency would result in more bankruptcies, since lenders un-
willing to continue their support on an unsecured basis, see Damarin & Co. v. Huron
Iron Co., 47 Ohio St. 581, 590, 26 N.E. 37, 40 (1890) (embarrassed company's right to
grant a security interest where necessary to forestall creditor action), would then have no
option but to file a petition against the debtor. But where a sophisticated creditor con-
cludes that bankruptcy is preferable to support unless he is preferred over other creditors,
bankruptcy is the optimal result. See pp. 1451-54 supra.
68. Equitable insolvency, the inability to meet one's obligations as they become due
in the ordinary course of business, relates to the firm's condition over a period of time,
in contrast to the static balance sheet test. 1 J. MooRE & L. KiNG, supra note 3, 1.19, at
98-99. It "conceives of insolvency as a status or condition, to be differentiated from mere
symptomatic occurrences such as chronic defaults in current payments." Id. at 99. This
conception of insolvency, "more ancient than bookkeeping itself," G. GLENN, supra note
12, § 13, at 22, is widely used outside of bankruptcy, id. § 13, and determines eligibility
for Chapter XI arrangements as well, Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970).
69. The proposed preference statute, drafted in the language of § 60, might read
as follows:
a. A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property of the
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt
made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they
matured in the ordinary course of business, the effect of which transfer will be to
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class.
b. Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee, provided that it shall be a
defense that the insolvency during which the transfer occurred was not directly related
to the ultimate bankruptcy.
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work-out period and would realize the goal of intercreditor equality
more fully than does existing law. In addition, the proposed rule may
even have salutary effects on the original lending agreements made
during the firm's period of financial health.
Under this rule, creditors of an insolvent debtor would have no in-
centive to pressure the debtor for preferential transfers. Since none
could gain advantage, each could rest assured that no other creditor
was draining the firm. Meanwhile, the firm's business could continue,
perhaps with all supplies paid for in cash and all new borrowings fully
secured. So long as such operations hold out the hope of increasing the
firm's net worth, the creditors-their rights protected vis-h-vis one
another-would continue to opt for support rather than for immediate
liquidation.
A. The Equitable Insolvency Test
The equitable insolvency test is widely employed and so presents
few novelties in its application.70 In particular cases, the policy behind
the rule, that of promoting cooperative behavior, could guide a court.71
Given the apparent ability of sophisticated lenders to detect trouble
in advance,72 no definition of "insolvency" could cover all situations in
which a creditor becomes concerned about its debt. Nor would such a
definition be desirable, for so long as the debtor is generally able to
pay its debts there is no objection to its doing so. It is only when favor-
ing one creditor begins to harm others that the interest in deterring
preferences arises.
The inability to pay matured obligations is a far more common
occurrence than either balance-sheet insolvency or bankruptcy itself;
in most cases it occurs before balance-sheet insolvency.73 The new
standard, therefore, would greatly increase the number of cases in which
70. See, e.g., G. GLENN, supra note 12, §§ 12-13; Krause, What Constitutes Insolvency, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION 1081, 1081-83 (H. Sellin ed. 1969).
71. Suppose, for example, a firm entered into a composition agreement with its
creditors in month one that aimed at an eventual recovery by providing for scaled-down
payments over time. In month three, the firm secretly paid a party to the composition in
full. In the month six bankruptcy proceeding, the policy of the statute clearly demands
that the preference be recoverable, even if the firm was making the payments to others
required by the composition. Such a result may be reached by recalling that the composi-
tion does not discharge the underlying claims until it has been paid in full, G. GLENN,
supra note 12, §§ 99-102, and thus is merely an extraordinary and contingent stay of
obligations that have already matured in the ordinary course of business. The firm may
therefore be considered insolvent as of month three.
72. See note 44 supra.
73. J. MAcLACHLAN, supra note 8, at 12; see Krause, supra note 70, at 1085 (Congress
aware of broad impact that choice of equity standard would have).
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the creditor would comprehend the need to seek a preference only when
it was too late, after insolvency had already occurred. Even a creditor
aware of the debtor's condition at all times may choose not to apply
pressure on the debtor preemptively, before equitable insolvency oc-
curs. Business firms, especially smaller firms, are so often in financial
difficulties short of equitable insolvency-usually without a liquidation
resulting74-that a creditor inclined to defect regularly in such situa-
tions would soon suffer a loss of business.7 5 The benefits of early
defection (which accrue only in the event of bankruptcy) outweigh the
fruits of support (which are realized if the firm survives) only when
the probability of bankruptcy is high; that probability will not be high
in most cases as long as the firm is meeting all of its obligations
promptly.
Under existing law a creditor can almost never be sure that a con-
templated transfer will be held voidable in bankruptcy. This uncer-
tainty is due both to the four-month rule and to the balance-sheet in-
solvency test. Unlike balance-sheet insolvency, equitable insolvency is
readily ascertainable by all types of creditors.7 6 The failure of prompt
payment is obvious to a creditor, and the extent of a default can be
ascertained informally or through trade organizations and publica-
tions7 7 More creditors would therefore be on notice that it is useless
to seek preferential treatment, and the deterrent effect of the law
would be enhanced.
78
Finally, the equitable insolvency standard brings the preference
provision into line with Chapter XI's eligibility standard:79 it would
no longer be possible for a firm to be "solvent" for preference purposes,
and yet qualify for Chapter XI. Preferences on the eve of a Chapter XI
petition would be as fully deterred as their eve-of-bankruptcy counter-
parts.
B. The Relatedness Proviso
Neither equality nor maximization would be served by avoidance of
transfers occurring outside "the penumbra of the financial eclipse that
74. See Small Business, Bus. WEEK, June 30, 1975, at 96; Coogan Testimony, supra
note 10, at 395.
75. See T. BECKMAN & R. FOSTER, supra note 24, at 519-25.
76. P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, supra note 27, at 563-64.
77. T. BECKMAN & R. FOSTER, supra note 24, at 386-91; Rosenberg Interview, supra
note 26, at 2-3.
78. The deterrent effect of a legal rule depends in large part on awareness of the rule
on the part of those to be detened. See, e.g., F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 141-42
(1973) (criminal law).
79. Bankruptcy Act § 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970) (contents of petition); see p. 1456
supra.
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finally overtook" the bankrupt,80 but this interest must be served
without compromise to the statute's deterrent effect.
Unlike the fixed time-limit rules it would replace, the relatedness
proviso would not invite creditors to defect prematurely and then hope
to be able to interpose the time-limit defense. The relatedness defense
would apply only if a substantial period of solvency intervened between
the transfer and the bankruptcy. During this period the debt would
have been payable, by definition, in the ordinary course of business.
The relatedness proviso protects only preferences that the defector did
not need to exact at all. The destructive effect of the preferential
transfer on the firm's prospects and the loss of goodwill resulting from
pressuring the debtor combine to make defection in reliance on the
relatedness proviso irrational and self-destructive.
The relatedness proviso would be more difficult for judges to apply
than the mechanical four-month rule it would replace. Only by sacri-
ficing the after-the-fact certainty of the four-month rule can the before-
the-fact certainty necessary for effective deterrence be gained. The
following examples demonstrate the workability of the proviso and
illustrate its meaning.
Consider a firm whose normal operating cycle-raw materials to
finished goods to receivables to cash-is four months. During a liquidity
crisis in year A, the firm preferred certain creditors but was unable to
pay most other creditors. The firm recovered its solvency later that year
and until month one of year C it did not again fall behind in payments
due. Bankruptcy followed in month six. The intervening period of
solvency-year B-was much longer than the firm's cycle and was clearly
long enough for the earlier insolvency to be deemed unrelated.
As under existing law, however, intervening solvency would not
constitute a complete and automatic defense.8' When solvency results
from an extraordinary transaction rather than a true business recovery,
the earlier insolvency should be deemed related. A comparison of the
length of the solvency with the firm's operating cycle should be proba-
tive of this fact.
Suppose, for example, the same firm factored a sufficient amount of
accounts receivable in month four to pay its debts due for that month,
but lapsed into equitable insolvency again in month five. Assuming
balance-sheet solvency during month four, the creditors paid during
80. 2 G. GLENN, supra note 52, § 379.
81. 3 J. MooRE & L. KING, supra note 3, 60.31, at 895 n.5 ("Where a business is of a
nature that fluctuates rapidly, the proof of later insolvency is of little weight" in de-
termining whether business was insolvent when transfer was made.)
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that month would not be considered preferred. A repayment of a term
loan in month three would still be voidable, however, since the in-
solvency beginning in month one was related to the ultimate bank-
ruptcy.
Application of the proviso would also require examination of the
firm's business practices. Consider another firm that for years had been
a habitual slow payer, regularly waiting for one overdue notice before
paying. In month one the firm began to be two, then three, months late
instead of its usual one month. In the bankruptcy that follows in month
six, transfers made before month one should not be deemed preferential
since the ordinary course of this firm's business included a certain
degree of lateness.
C. The Distributional Effect of the Proposed Rule
Greater equality in liquidation can be attained by discouraging and
avoiding preferences. This redistributes wealth to the estate from the
sophisticated or influential creditors that now succeed in retaining
preferences. The estate can then distribute its greater wealth to the
unsophisticated and sophisticated creditors according to the sizes of
their claims. The ultimate net redistribution is impossible to predict
since all the creditors will, in turn, pass on some of these costs and
benefits to their customers and absorb the remainder in their own
profit and loss.82 Because of the effect of the rule on creditor behavior
during insolvency, however, the total costs of insolvency would be
reduced.sa
82. Even under perfect competition, computation of the degree of passing on is com-
plex and requires calculation of elasticities of supply and demand. Shaefer, Passing-On
Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 Wm. &
MARY L. Rav. 883, 887-900 (1975).
To the extent that costs and benefits are passed on, redistributive effects should
roughly cancel since most business units and consumers deal with both the sophisticated
and the unsophisticated. To the extent that costs are not passed on, there would be a
redistribution from sophisticated creditors (e.g., banks) to the less sophisticated (e.g.,
suppliers of goods), a factor that would determine the interest of each group in the
passage of such a statute. Compare House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 3, at 1749-50
(Robert Grimmig, American Bankers Ass'n) with id. at 1668 (Richard Kaufman, Nat'l
Ass'n of Credit Management) (bankers support preference scienter requirement, trade
creditors oppose).
83. If, for some reason, sophisticated creditors are to be subsidized or interest rates
artificially reduced in preference to other prices, means should be employed that accom-
plish the desired transfer without deadweight losses. C. WILcox, PUBLIC PoLicIEs TOWARD
BUSINESS 786-806 (4th ed. 1971). Interest rates are best controlled by the open market
policies of the Federal Reserve. D. JAcoBs, L. FARWELL & E. NEAVE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
570-71 (5th ed. 1972).
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D. The Effect on the Lending Decision
The total amount of bank credit loaned to business firms may be
directly affected by changes in preference law. Some borrowers would
borrow less at higher interest rates, and lenders might be unwilling to
lend as much, or on the same terms, as they do under existing law.
When a loan is made the possibility of bankruptcy does not loom large,
as it does in work-out situations.8 4 Accordingly, the preference provi-
sions cannot be expected to play a major role in shaping creditor
behavior at this earlier stage. But to the extent that creditors realize in
advance that preferential treatment will later be impossible to obtain,
the proposed rule's effects on the decision to lend would be salutary.
The proposed rule would suppress loans made in reliance on the
possibility of future preferential repayment or security.,,- Loans to
more creditworthy firms would be unaffected by the change in the
preference rule; competitive forces would continue to guarantee favor-
able terms to nonmarginal firms."6 For marginal firms, the credi-
tors are in a position analogous to that of the holders of secret equitable
liens.87 Both credit arrangements lead to the overextension of credit by
creating the illusion that the debtor has unencumbered assets available
for pro rata distribution in the event of default.8s Indeed, several
creditors may have lent in implicit reliance on future preference with
respect to the same assets. When the firm begins to encounter difficul-
ties, these unsecured assets provide the temptation to defect that leads
to a destructive race of diligence to obtain preferences.
The decision to lend in such cases is based on an inaccurate assump-
tion, since not all creditors can be preferred. The effect of the proposed
84. Provisions for loan losses of commercial banks typically average less than one-third
of one percent of outstanding loans. BANK ADMIINSMATION INSTITUTE, THE 1975 BAI
INDEX OF BANK PERFORMANCE (1976) (unpaginated).
85. If there is a public interest in making credit available on a subsidized basis to
certain marginal borrowers, credit can be made available directly. See, e.g., P. HUNT, C.
WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, supra note 27, at 526-34 (Small Business Administration loan
programs). Any "subsidy" created by the present system is, in effect, a redistribution to
marginal firms from the less sophisticated creditors who lend on the illusion of an un-
secured asset pool.
86. See D. HODGMAN, COMMERCIAL BANK LOAN AND INVESTMENT POLICY 28, 36-37, 97-
112, 158-59 (1963) (although competition in banking is hardly "cut-throat," neither is it
oligopolistic); P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, supra note 27, at 236 (competitive
pressures may permit borrower to wring concessions from bank lenders).
87. Now known as holders of unperfected security interests, these creditors regularly
escaped preference attack on the ground that their liens, although filed on the eve of
bankruptcy, related back to the date of the original transfer. J. HONNOLD, CASES &
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING 571-74 (4th ed. 1976).
88. The prevention of general overextension of credit has been considered a major
function of preference law. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 8, at 283. Indeed, the passage of
the first national preference statute was predicated on this idea. Id. at 284.
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rule would be to discourage the overextension of credit in marginal
cases by encouraging lenders to take security interests at the time the
loan is made. The security interest would be publicly filed; 9 sub-
sequent credit need not be provided in the vain hope that the assets in
question would in fact be available to unsecured creditors in bank-
ruptcy. This may seem a harsh result at first: if lenders secure fully at
the time of each loan, fewer unencumbered assets would remain for
other creditors. The loss of unsecured assets is quite illusory, however,
for without a fully deterrent preference policy, those assets would quite
likely have been pledged to secure one loan or another by the time of
bankruptcy.90
Conclusion
Without a means of controlling creditors' pursuit of preferential
transfers, the economic incentives presented to creditors of a troubled
firm can lead to a mutually destructive "race of diligence." Existing
preference law fails to prevent this race. Preference law should there-
fore be modified to eliminate creditors' incentives to defect premature-
ly during the work-out period. Lacking the option of reaching a "sepa-
rate peace" with the debtor, the creditor will find himself injured by
any harm he does to the firm through obtaining a preference. Instead,
the energies of creditors with special knowledge or special analytic capa-
bilities would be turned toward preserving the greatest total value for
the firm, an endeavor that would incidentally protect other creditors as
well. Creditors would find it much easier to sit down together and pool
their knowledge and judgments to arrive at the best solution. The
temptation to defect singly and the fear that others may do so would
no longer frustrate these efforts; composing creditors would be able
to force a recalcitrant creditor to disgorge its preference more effective-
ly than they can under present law. The life of the firm would not be
prolonged in order to run out the four-month period on some transfer,
nor would costly Chapter proceedings or wasteful liquidations in
bankruptcy be precipitated unnecessarily. In this way, the skills and
knowledge of sophisticated and favored lenders can be turned from the
pursuit of individual gain toward cooperation for the benefit of all.
89. U.C.C. § 9-202.
90. 3 J. MooRE & L. KING, supra note 3, 60.01, at 744.
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